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Recently, the American legal and business communities have become
increasingly aware of the need for new approaches to the resolution of legal
disputes. Spurred by a growing dissatisfaction throughout our society with
the judicial process, members of the organized bar, the judiciary, corporate
legal departments and law firms have begun to devote substantial efforts to
the search for procedures which will permit the resolution of disputes with-
out the costs, delays and other disadvantages which have regrettably
become characteristic of conventional litigation.
In this article we will focus attention on a particular type of dispute-the
commercial dispute between business entities-and attempt to apply some
of the excellent work which has already been done in the domestic context
to the more complex and, in some respects, arcane area of international
commercial disputes.
I. The Need for Alternatives to Conventional Remedies
The search for solutions must obviously begin with a description of the
problem. For our purposes here, the discussion proceeds on two levels.
First, those attributes of the conventional litigation process which give rise
to problems in the resolution of domestic commercial disputes create simi-
lar difficulties where the dispute is an international one. Secondly, how-
ever, there is an overlay of distinct problems and complexities which arise
in the international context. For purposes of this article, when we refer to
an "international" or "transnational" dispute, we simply mean a legal dis-
pute arising in relation to a business transaction, relationship or event
which, by reason of the nationality or domicile of the parties, the locus of
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performance or territorial effects, the applicable law and/or any other oper-
ative factors, involves more than one national legal system.
A. Problems Common to Domestic and
International Disputes
The principal problems inherent in conventional litigation have been dis-
cussed in considerable detail elsewhere,' and we will summarize them only
briefly before turning to others which are more specific to international
commercial disputes.
1. DIVERSION OF ENERGIES TO NON-CENTRAL ISSUES
The development of the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence has
been characterized by an emphasis-one might even say a preoccupation-
with the creation of procedural safeguards intended to ensure the fairness
of the adjudicatory process. Our tools of pretrial discovery, rules of evi-
dence and cross-examination, and rights of appeal are all part of this struc-
ture and are so ingrained in our concept of fundamental fairness that they
long ago acquired the status of constitutionally protected rights.
There is, however, a growing recognition that this panoply of procedural
safeguards has in many cases "become baggage too heavy for many liti-
gants to carry."'2 Anxious to leave no stone unturned in protecting their
client's rights, counsel frequently feel compelled to carry out the broadest
possible discovery, contest every procedural point and pursue every possi-
ble theory, no matter how far-fetched. These tendencies are facilitated by
the comprehensiveness of our discovery procedures and by the possibility of
alternative pleading. They are further encouraged in part by the fear that
any failure to assert a claim or right may result in its being waived and in
part by a desire to maximize the strength of negotiating positions. Coupled
with the frequent desire of a defendant to prolong the process in the hope of
wearing down the plaintiff, these factors result in a continuing diversion of
the time and attention of counsel, the parties and the courts to issues which
are at best ancillary to the main area of dispute.
2. LACK OF MANAGEMENT INVOLVEMENT
A second major factor contributing to the dissatisfaction with conven-
tional litigation procedures as a means of resolving complex commercial
disputes is the tendency of corporate managers to "wash their hands" of a
dispute once it has been turned over to the lawyers.3 This inclination no
doubt stems in large part from the understandable reluctance of managers
'See, e.g., E. Green, J. Marks and R. Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation: An Alternate
Approach, II Loy. L.A. L. REV. 493, 493-501 (1978).
2D. Ebel, Bar Programs-Other Ways to Resolve Disputes, 6 LITIGATION 25 (1980).
1R. Olson, Dispute Resolution: An Alternativefor Large Case Litigation, 6 LITIGATION 22, 24
(1980).
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to participate in a process which they cannot control and frequently do not
fully understand. It is significantly reinforced, however, by the technical
nature of the lengthy pretrial proceedings and by the perceived risk that a
business executive, by participating actively in the process prior to trial,
may say or do something that might prejudice the company's position.
Whatever the causes, the failure of corporate managers to participate
directly in the procedures leading up to trial results in their being insulated
from the facts being developed and the issues being raised in the course of
the litigation. This in turn means that they are not in a position to make
independent judgments as to the merits both of their own case and of their
opponent's. Since a realistic appreciation of the merits of the dispute is
normally essential to a commercial resolution, these factors tend to combine
to prolong litigation unnecessarily.
3. COMBATIVE AND FORMALISTIC ENVIRONMENT
Partly because the lawyers are frequently left to their own devices in
managing litigation, and partly because they believe that their effectiveness
as lawyers will be judged on the basis of their ability to obtain a better
result than the merits of the dispute might justify, they often tend to be
more interested in "scoring points" against the other side than in achieving
an expeditious and just resolution of the dispute.4 In fairness, it should be
added that this is all too often a product of their client's desire, either real or
apparent, for vindication rather than necessarily for equity. Regardless of
the causes, the tendency of commercial litigation to degenerate into a con-
test pitting the technical skills of one party's lawyers against those of oppos-
ing counsel, rather than a search for an equitable resolution of the
underlying dispute, would appear to be so well established as to require no
further elaboration.
A related point concerns the inhibiting effect of the formal litigation pro-
cess on the frank exchange of information and perspectives between the
parties. In the game of trial preparation, a premium is placed on the ability
of each party's lawyers to gain insights into the theories of the other party's
case, as well as facts which may be helpful to their own client's position,
without disclosing comparable information or making admissions which
might be damaging at trial. This gamesmanship makes it extremely diffi-
cult for the parties to pursue a constructive dialogue aimed at reducing the
dispute to its basic elements and then attempting to find a mutually satisfac-
tory basis for settlement. It is also, of course, part of the reason that corpo-
rate managers shy away from participation in the process.
4. DELAYS DUE TO COURT CONGESTION
A further factor undermining the utility of litigation as a procedure for
achieving resolution of disputes is the incredible explosion of litigation in
'Id at 22.
218 INTERNA4TIONAL LAWYER
our courts. It has been estimated that, extrapolating current rates of growth
in the number of cases being filed in the federal courts, by the year 2010 we
can expect over 10 million cases to be commenced in the federal district
courts each year.5 Perhaps nothing more clearly demonstrates the need for
alternative dispute resolution procedures than this staggering projection.
5. COSTS
As a result of all of the factors outlined above, the high costs of dispute
resolution through the judicial process have become a matter of great con-
cern to lawyers and businessmen alike.6 Even where a company honestly
believes in the correctness of its position, the costs of litigating can be
expected to be so great that management is confronted with a true Hobson's
choice; whether or not the company pursues judicial remedies, its customers
and its shareholders will certainly come out the worse, the only question
being which of the two evils is the lesser.
But the costs of commercial litigation are by no means limited to the
financial expenses borne in the first instance by the parties. As staggering
as those expenses are, they are probably far less important in the aggregate
than the social costs resulting from the paralysis of our judicial system. As
a direct consequence of that paralysis, our citizens are also confronted with
delays and costs in obtaining redress of their own grievances. For these
individuals, particularly those of limited means, justice delayed is truly jus-
tice denied.
B. Problems Specfic to International Disputes
The formal mechanisms typically employed for the adjudication of inter-
national commercial disputes include not only the traditional procedures
before national judicial bodies but, increasingly, the alternative avenues
offered by international commercial arbitration. Each has its own problems
and advantages!
1. JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Assuming that jurisdictional requirements are met, the courts of most
countries are of course open to disputes involving one or more foreign par-
ties. However, the complexity inherent in the multi-jurisdictional character
of international disputes tends to exacerbate the problems outlined above.
F. Sander, Varieties oDispute Processing: Proceedings of the Pound Conference, 70 F.R.D.
79 (1976); See also J. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975).
'The amount spent annually in the United States for compensation of lawyers and their
support staff has been estimated by a prominent lawyer to equal some 1.4 % of the gross
national product of the United States. See .4 Lawyer on Lawyers, N.Y. Times, April 28, 1982
at 14, cols. 4-6, reporting on a speech delivered by Lloyd N. Cutler. While this figure would
include legal costs other than those incurred in actual litigation, it is indicative of the
extraordinary commitment of resources to the legal process, broadly construed, in the United
States.
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a. Opportunities for Forum-Shopping and Disputes as to
Jurisdiction and Procedure
If forum-shopping is a problem in our federal jurisprudence, that prob-
lem takes on a totally new dimension in the international context. Because
of differences in the substantive laws, public policies and procedures in
force in various countries, each party to a dispute may perceive material
advantage in the selection of one available forum over another. In some
cases, the parties may entertain doubts, or hopes, that a particular forum
may be less than impartial.
As a result of these factors, the parties often attempt to bring the dispute
before different forums. And, since there are no internationally accepted
rules governing the exercise of jurisdiction by national courts, a given inter-
national dispute may fall within the competency of the courts of more than
one country.
7
An indication of the extent to which forum-shopping is practiced in inter-
national litigation is provided by the large number of cases in which liti-
gants have attempted to bring before American courts disputes whose
principal focus was elsewhere in the world. Their objective has generally
been to avail themselves of certain provisions of American substantive law,
frequently in such areas as securities regulation, 8 antitrust,9 tort liability' °
and environmental law. I" A particularly striking example of this type of
effort may be found in the recent case in which Paraguayan nationals
brought a wrongful death action in the courts of the United States against
another Paraguayan national, alleging that the defendant had, under color
of official authority, caused the death by torture of plaintiffs' son in Para-
guay in violation of international law. ' 2 While this is obviously an unusual
instance, it illustrates the extremes to which litigants may be prepared to go
where the stakes are perceived to be high.
7See V. Nanda, Forum Selection and Choice-of-Law Agreements in International Contracts,
in I V. NANDA, ed., THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL BusINEss TRANSACTIONS § 8.01 (Looseleaf
1981).
"See, e.g., Continental Grain (Australia) Pty. Ltd. v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., et al., 592 F.2d
409 (8th Cir. 1979); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied
423 U.S. 1018 (1975); lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Grunenthal GmbH. v.
Hotz, et al., 511 F. Supp. 582 (C.D. Cal. 1981).
'See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc., et al. v. Government of India, et al., 434 U.S. 308 (1978); International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., .595
F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir.
1976).
"See, e.g., Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno, - U.S. - 70 L. Ed. 2d 419, 102 S. Ct. 252
(1981); Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981).
"See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc., et al. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Sierra Club v. Adams, 578 F.2d 389 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. United States Depart-
ment of State, et al., 452 F. Supp. 1226 (D.D.C. 1978). See also Note, Exports and Environmen-
tal Responsibility. Applying NEFA to the Export-Import Bank, 12 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 247
(1979).
"
2Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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The problems of forum-shopping and concurrent jurisdiction are made
all the more serious by the absence of international rules or procedures for
the resolution of jurisdictional disputes and the avoidance of multiple liti-
gation.13 While American courts will sometimes stay their own proceedings
pending the outcome of appeals of foreign judgments on the merits of the
same dispute,' 4 the mere pendency of foreign litigation is generally not a
basis for a stay.' 5 The result is often litigation proceeding simultaneously
before the courts of two or more countries in respect of the same dispute. 16
It is unnecessary to elaborate upon the potential for lawyerly mischief, and
the concomitant added cost and delay, which are inherent in this kind of
multijurisdictional situation,
b. Additional Procedural Complexities
Even where litigation is confined to a single jurisdiction, the involvement
of nationals of other jurisdictions creates a variety of procedural complica-
tions which can divert the time, energy and resources of the litigants from
the central issues in the dispute. A particularly compelling example of this
tendency can be found in the recent Westinghouse uranium litigation,' 7 in
which Westinghouse sought to establish the existence of an international
cartel among uranium producers which allegedly had brought about an
extraordinary increase in the price of uranium. Employing the traditional
tools of pre-trial discovery, the American lawyers for Westinghouse sought
the assistance of the courts of Australia, Canada, France, South Africa and
the United Kingdom to compel the production of documents by the defen-
dants, and employees of the defendants, in those countries for use in con-
nection with the American proceedings. These efforts proved unsuccessful,
largely due to the hostility of the foreign courts to the scope and breadth of
American discovery procedures.' 8 In the process, however, months of time
were lost and hundreds of thousands of dollars were expended on both
sides.
Over the last several years, substantial efforts have been made at the
intergovernmental level to streamline the procedures for service of process
'V. NANDA, supra n.7, § 8.01.
"Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., 492 F. Supp. 885 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
'
51d ; as to the analogous situation involving actions pending in the two states of the United
States, however, see R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 220-221 (2d
ed. 1980).
'"An excellent example is to be found in the parallel proceedings before the courts of both
the United States and the United Kingdom in connection with the dispute between Nelson
Bunker Hunt and British Petroleum arising out of the Libyan nationalization of certain oil
concessions, as described in Hunt v. BP Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd., supra n.14, 492 F. Supp.
at 888-890.
In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Contract Litigation, 436 F. Supp. 990 (J.P.M.D.L. 1977).
' In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No. 232
[1977] 3 W.L.R. 430, 434-436 (C.A.), as quoted in R. Mehrige, The Westinghouse Uranium
Case: Problems Encountered in Seeking Foreign Discovery and Evidence, 13 INT'L LAW. 19, 22
(1979); see also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contract Litigation, M.D.L. Docket No.
235 (No. 1) (No. 2), [19781 2 W.L.R. 81 (H.L.).
International Commercial Disputes
and taking of evidence in foreign countries. 19 Notwithstanding the progress
which has been achieved, however, procedural differences among the vari-
ous legal systems will continue to stand as an added source of confusion
and cause of disputes totally unrelated to the main issues between the par-
ties to transnational litigation.
c. Enforcement of Judgments
That litigation before a national court has resulted in an eventual judg-
ment does not mean that a dispute is at an end, even after all appeals have
been exhausted. Unlike judgments rendered by the courts of another state
of the United States, judgments entered by foreign courts are not entitled to
automatic enforcement by American courts under the "full faith and credit"
clause of the United States Constitution; 20 neither do foreign courts auto-
matically accord such treatment to judgments rendered by American courts.
In either case, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments depend on
notions of comity and fairness which, however, have not been fully or con-
sistently articulated. 2'
Under prevailing standards, enforcement of foreign judgments may be
resisted on a number of grounds. In the United States, the principal
defenses to enforcement of a foreign judgment are lack of jurisdiction of the
foreign tribunal, denial of procedural due process and contravention of the
public policy of the forum in which enforcement is sought. 22 In theory,
American courts recognize the judgments of foreign courts only on a basis
of reciprocity; however, the requirement of reciprocity has been criticized
and may no longer be the prevailing rule.2
3
Foreign courts tend to be less willing than American courts to recognize
and give effect to foreign judgments. Indeed, it has been suggested that
"non-recognition of United States judgments abroad is the rule rather than
'"Of particular importance in this regard are the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judi-
cial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, [19691 20 U.S.T. 361,
T.I.A.S. No. 6638, and the Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444.
"'For the policy reasons underlying this difference in treatment, see A. von Mehren and D.
Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications:. A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81
HARV. L. REV. 1601, 1606-1607 (1968).
" R. von Mehren and M. Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judg-
ments in the United States, 6 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 45 (1974); for summaries of the prac-
tices of the courts of the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany, see
H. STEINER and D. VAGTS, MATERIALS ON TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 704-720
(1968).
2See generally R. von Mehren and M. Patterson, supra, n.21; see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 98 (1969).
2 The classic statement of the reciprocity rule is contained in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113
(1895), which remains the leading American precedent on the subject. For analysis and criti-
cism of the rule, see R. von Mehren and M. Patterson, supra n.21 at 46-48; see also Comment,
The Reciprocity Rule and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 16 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 327
(1977).
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the exception."' 24 A major stumbling block to foreign recognition of an
American judgment is frequently the difficulty of establishing to the satis-
faction of the foreign court that the American courts would in fact accord
reciprocity. 25
In any case, the difficulty of obtaining recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments creates still another opportunity for the use of the law-
yer's skills to prolong rather than resolve the underlying dispute. Like the
other complications mentioned above, this attribute of the international
judicial process renders conventional dispute resolution through adjudica-
tion even less satisfactory in the international context than domestically.
d. Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Problems
Still another set of problems with the use of judicial procedures to resolve
international commercial disputes results from the increasing participation
of governments in activities which, in the American economic system, are
essentially private in nature. Under the same principles of comity to which
courts theoretically adhere in recognizing foreign judgments, most courts
are unwilling to be put in the position of asserting jurisdiction over, or chal-
lenging the acts of, the government of another state. These judicial atti-
tudes, which have their roots in principles of customary international law
going back hundreds of years, are embodied in the modern doctrines of
sovereign immunity and act of state.
As originally developed in this country and elsewhere, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity precluded national courts from asserting jurisdiction
over foreign governments under any circumstances save in the case of a
waiver by the foreign government itself.26 Under the modern approach,
however, the immunity attaches only in respect to activities carried out by
the foreign government in its sovereign capacity; accordingly, to the extent
that governments engage in activity which is commercial rather than gov-
ernmental in character, they may not under this so-called "restrictive" the-
ory invoke the sovereign immunity defense.27
Unfortunately, despite the apparent clarity of the distinction between
"commercial" and "governmental" activities, it tends to break down in
practice. Most governmental activities are regarded by the governments
concerned as carried out for a public purpose, and therefore as governmen-
tal in nature, even though the specific acts in question might be identical to
those engaged in elsewhere by private businesses. The most extreme occur-
rences of this dichotomy are to be found in the activities of state-owned
4New York State Bar Ass'n, Report and Proposed Resolution of Committee on International
Law, quoted in R. von Mehren and M. Patterson, supra n. 21 at 81.
11R. von Mehren, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the United States, 17 VA. J. INT'L L.
401, 405-406 (1977).
"The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 97 (1812).
"Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de Abastecimientos y Transported, 336 F.2d
354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
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business enterprises in the nonmarket economies. An excellent example of
the problems posed in such cases is to be found in the suit brought in the
courts of the United Kingdom against the government of Cuba by the
owners of two cargos of sugar loaded aboard vessels chartered to an entity
of the Cuban government which had contracted to deliver the sugar to buy-
ers in Chile. When a coup d'etat resulted in a change of government in
Chile, the government of Cuba directed one of the vessels to proceed to
North Vietnam. There the sugar was sold to another commercial agency of
the Cuban government which then, obviously for political reasons, donated
it to the people of North Vietnam. The House of Lords divided three to
two on the question whether the government of Cuba was entitled to invoke
the defense of sovereign immunity in respect of the claim for conversion of
this cargo, the majority holding that the transfer of the sugar to the second
Cuban agency had deliberately been structured as a commercial transaction
and that immunity therefore did not apply. 28
Under the sovereign immunities legislation now in force in the United
States 29 and the United Kingdom,30 whether a particular activity is charac-
terized as either governmental or commercial is determined by reference to
the specific course of conduct, transaction or act which gives rise to the
dispute over which jurisdiction is sought rather than by inquiry into the
overall purpose of the activities in question. 3' However, legislation of this
kind is the exception rather than the rule, and there is a clear need for an
international effort to achieve uniformity in this area. 32 In the meantime,
the uncertainties and differences in the approaches taken by national courts
of various countries on the subject of sovereign immunity create additional
opportunities for the kind of forum-shopping and legal maneuvering which
tend to divert the parties from efforts to resolve the central dispute.
The act of state doctrine is founded on policies similar to those reflected
in the principles of sovereign immunity. Under that doctrine, an American
court will abstain from adjudicating a dispute, even as between American
litigants, where such adjudication would require the court to look behind
the sovereign acts of a foreign government. 33 Like the sovereign immunity
doctrine, the act of state doctrine as applied by our courts precludes adjudi-
cation only in respect to acts of foreign governments in their sovereign
"Marble Islands v. I Congreso del Partido, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 328 (H.L.), summarized and
discussed in M. Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 402-404 (1982).
"Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, P.L. 94-583, codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1332(a)(2), (3) and (4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611.30State Immunity Act 1978, reprinted at 17 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1123 (1978).
31 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, supra n.26, § 1603(d), (e); State Immunity Act, supra
n.30, § 3.
3 See C. Brower, W. Bistline and G. Loomis, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
in Practice, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 200, 213 (1979).
13Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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capacity, as opposed to acts of a commercial character. 34 The distinction,
however, is no clearer in the act of state context than in the context of sover-
eign immunity.
The field of application of the act of state doctrine by American courts
has been reduced by the enactment of the so-called "Sabbatino Amend-
ment,"' 35 which precludes judicial abstension based on the doctrine in speci-
fied types of cases unless the president determines that such abstention is in
the foreign policy interests of the United States. However, the Sabbatino
Amendment has been construed somewhat narrowly, 36 and the act of state
doctrine continues to stand as a significant obstacle to adjudication of com-
mercial disputes where the acts of foreign governments are involved. A
prime example is to be found in the protracted litigation which ensured
from a dispute arising in the early 1970s between two American oil compa-
nies in relation to drilling rights which each of them had been granted in
adjoining areas of the Persian Gulf by two different sheiks. 37 When oil was
discovered in one of the concessions, the neighboring sovereign, allegedly at
the inducement of its concessionaire, asserted an expanded territorial claim
which brought the discovery within the scope of the latter's concession. The
resulting litigation, which ultimately involved some 120 separate district
court actions in the fifth judicial circuit alone, 38 featured repeated motions
and appeals in two circuits as to the applicability of the Sabbatino Amend-
ment and of the act of state doctrine.39 While this was clearly an unusual
case, the point is that actions of foreign governments are frequently impor-
tant factors in international commercial disputes, and the act of state doc-
4Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976); see also Indus-
trial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903
(1980); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
"P.L. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1013 (1964), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2730(e)(2).
"See Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978), affd,
583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992 (1979); see also Note, lnternationalArbitration
and the Inapplicability of the Act of State Doctrine, 14 J. INT'L L. & POL. 65, 100-109 (1981).
"
7Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
a]f'd 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Occidental of Umm al
Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Service Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975), aF'd sub nom.
Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard the
Tanker Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928
(1979).
'"577 F.2d at 1205 n.19.
"The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ultimately avoided both issues by determining
that, because adjudication of the case would have required a determination of the validity of
territorial claims asserted by the respective sovereigns, the case was non-justiciable under the
political question doctrine as elaborated in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); see 577 F.2d at
1201-1205. This decision may foreshadow the development of an entire new area of uncer-
tainty in the adjudication of international disputes arising from that doctrine. In similarly
protracted parallel litigation in the United Kingdom, the House of Lords ultimately arrived at
much the same result, concluding that decision of the case would require the determination of
non-justiciable issues. Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Hammer and Others, [1981] 3 W.L.R. 787
(H.L.) As an eminent authority has observed, this case may eventually prove to have "greatly
expanded the concept of judicial restraint" embodied in the British act of state doctrine. M.
Leigh, Judicial Decisions, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 385, 402 (1982).
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trine may at least arguably preclude resolution of such disputes on their
merits by our courts and thus afford substantial opportunity for delaying
tactics even if eventually held to be inapplicable. 40
2. ARBITRATION
Largely in response to some of the problems of international litigation
already discussed, international lawyers have increasingly turned to com-
mercial arbitration as an alternative vehicle for dispute resolution through
third-party adjudication. Moreover, substantial progress has been made in
the development of an institutional and legal framework for arbitration
which is in many respects more highly developed than the international
judicial process. Through the work of the United Nations Committee on
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), a set of rules of arbitration 4' have
been developed which, together with the Rules of Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion of the International Chamber of Commerce,4 2 have achieved wide-
spread international acceptance for use in all but the most specialized kinds
of commercial disputes. In addition, a large number of countries have
become party to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 43 commonly known as the "New
York Convention," under which it has become substantially easier both to
compel" arbitration to the exclusion of parallel judicial proceedings-
reducing if not eliminating the possibility of forum-shopping-and to
enforce an award once it has been obtained.
International commercial arbitration consequently affords an extremely
useful means of minimizing the opportunity for some of the more egregious
kinds of procedural maneuvering frequently found in international judicial
proceedings. At the same time, however, conventional 45 arbitration retains
"In National American Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622 (S.D. N.Y.
1978), af'd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979), the Nigerian government invoked the doctrine in
defense of a claim alleging its failure to pay demurrage charges on a commercial shipment,
asserting that the delay resulted from an official decree embargoing the port of Lagos. The
court refused to apply the doctrine, holding that the protection it afforded did not extend
beyond the direct legal consequences of the sovereign act in question. 448 F. Supp. at 640.
While the refusal to apply the doctrine is comforting, the elasticity of the standard applied will
obviously enable creative counsel to delay proceedings in similar circumstances until this pre-
liminary issue can be resolved.
4'31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, Doc. A/31/17 (1976), reprinted at 15 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS
701 (1976).
"International Chamber of Commerce, Rules for the ICC Court of Arbitration, P.L. 291 at
9-21 (1980).
"3[1970] 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997.
"The Convention probably does not require the courts of a state party to it to order specific
performance of the agreement to arbitrate. However, it does require the courts to refer the
parties to arbitration except where the agreement to arbitrate is "null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed." See L. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement ofForeign ArbitralA wards, 70 YALE
L.J. 1049, 1063-1064 (1961).
"Proponents of arbitration will quarrel with this terminology on the ground that it implies
there is some "standard" form of arbitration, whereas arbitration is inherently flexible and
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to some extent the disadvantages of other formal procedures for dispute
resolution by adjudication, including in particular the creation of a combat-
ive environment and the absence of participation by senior management
personnel. In this connection it should be noted that the term "arbitration"
encompasses both "institutional" arbitration, administered by an organiza-
tion such as the International Chamber of Commerce or the American
Arbitration Association and usually conducted under the rules of that
organization, and "ad hoc" arbitration, administered and conducted in a
.manner specifically defined by the parties. In either case, the arbitration
agreement may be included as a provision in the original commercial con-
tract or drawn up and agreed to by the parties after the dispute has arisen.
Subject to certain technical requirements, 46 the provisions of the New York
Convention will apply regardless of these formal variations. The extent to
which the disadvantages referred to above will inhere in a particular arbi-
tration will of course depend on the way in which the arbitration is struc-
tured. In addition, again depending on that structure, there may be certain
other disadvantages which are unique to arbitration.
a. Forum Costs
Whatever their inadequacies, judicialfora have the distinct advantage, at
least in most countries, of being provided and paid for by governments
rather than by private litigants utilizing their services. By contrast, the
forum costs of an arbitration must be defrayed by the parties to the
arbitration.
At minimum, the expense involved must include the fees and expenses of
the arbitrator or arbitrators. Since arbitrators tend to be chosen from
among the ranks of experienced commercial lawyers, this is obviously no
small expense.
Where the parties choose to utilize institutional as opposed to ad hoc
arbitration, the expenses include the administrative fees charged by the
institution in question. For example, under the schedules of the Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce, the total cost of an arbitration by three arbi-
designed precisely to permit the parties to structure their own procedures. However, we
believe it is fair to say that most commercial arbitration has in fact been cast in a relatively
stereotyped format, rot because it has to be but largely because lawyers have tended to adhere
to known procedures, many of them drawn by analogy from the judicial arena.
'Article 1(l) of the Convention provides as follows:
Each contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the parties
undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may
arise between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration. (Emphasis supplied).
In addition, article 1(3) authorizes states ratifying or acceding to the Convention to do so sub-
ject to reservations limiting the applicability of the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to
awards made in the territory of another Contracting State and/or to disputes "arising out of
legal relationships, whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the
national law" of the state declaring such a reservation. The United States acceded to the
Convention subject to both of the permitted reservations.
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trators involving a claim of $1,200,000 might be as much as $110,000. 47
This cost is in addition to the costs incurred by each of the parties for attor-
neys' fees and expenses. The high level of the total costs involved has, not
surprisingly, led to some disenchantment with institutional arbitration.
b. Procedural Uncertainties
Unlike a judicial proceeding, commercial arbitration does not take place
within a framework of well-defined rules regulating such matters as pre-
hearing proceedings, submission of documents to the tribunal, detailed
presentation of complex issues prior to hearing, submission of memoranda
of law, hearing procedures, use of expert witnesses and the rendering of
decisions on procedural and other preliminary issues.4 8 In addition, except
where well-developed rules such as those of the ICC or UNCITRAL are
used, the parties must make detailed arrangements regarding procedures
for the appointment of arbitrators, replacement of arbitrators where neces-
sary, submission of pleadings, entry of awards, allocation of costs and
enforcement of awards.
49
Since all of the foregoing matters are regulated by the agreement of the
parties, and that agreement is generally entered into as part of a commercial
agreement of which the arbitration clause is only a very small and ancillary
part, it is often the case that most of these issues must ultimately be resolved
in a contractual vacuum. Unfortunately, this absence of well-defined pro-
cedural ground rules tends to enhance the likelihood that the time and
resources of the parties will be diverted from the central issues in the dis-
pute, particularly where one party seeks to delay the arbitral process.
50
In addition, American lawyers are often concerned that the discovery
permitted in arbitration proceedings will generally be substantially nar-
rower in scope than that available in American court proceedings and that
the arbitrators may lack effective power to compel the production of docu-
ments or the presentation of witnesses for deposition. 5 1 It has been aptly
suggested that "this hindrance to fact development is the principal price
paid for the advantages of arbitration."
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4'F. Higgins, W. Brown and P. Roach, Pit/alls in International Commercial Arbitration, 35
Bus. LAW. 1035, 1042 n.24, (1980).
"For an outline of the procedural issues which should be addressed in drafting an arbitra-
tion agreement or terms of reference, see A. McClelland, International Arbitration. A Practical
Guidefor the Effective Use of the System for Litigation of Transnational Commercial Disputes,
12 INT'L LAW. 83 (1978).
49/d
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c. Impact on Substantive Rights
A particularly interesting aspect of commercial arbitration, which may be
an advantage or a disadvantage depending upon the context in which it
arises, is that arbitrators are generally much less likely than national courts
to entertain claims or defenses alleging violation of regulatory laws which
are grounded on considerations of public policy rather than of equity
between private parties. In part for this reason, our courts have generally
refused to compel or permit arbitration of legal disputes involving alleged
violations of, for example, the antitrust or securities laws.5 3 However, in
the landmark case of Scherk v. Alberto Culver & Co., the United States
Supreme Court held that a claim involving alleged violation of the anti-
fraud provisions of the securities laws could not be brought before our
courts where the underlying agreement was "truly international in charac-
ter" and included an arbitration clause.5 4 Based in part on the signature by
the United States of the New York Convention, which however was not yet
in force for the United States, the court concluded that the public policy
favoring strengthening of the system of international commercial arbitra-
tion precluded judicial intervention in the arbitral process under the cir-
cumstances of that case. 55 While Scherk was decided in the specific context
of an alleged violation of the securities laws, the Court's reasoning would
appear to compel the same result in an international dispute in which one
of the parties alleges violation of American antitrust laws or other statutes
designed primarily to protect the public interest rather than to regulate rela-
tions between commercial partners.5 6
All of this gives rise to the interesting possibility that arbitration clauses
may be used to reduce the likelihood that one of the parties may utilize
spurious claims under laws such as our securities and antitrust laws either
as a lever in compelling a favorable resolution of a commercial dispute or
as a tactic designed to delay and complicate the process of adjudication. In
an international commercial arbitration, assuming one of the parties is
American and the other a national of a foreign country, the "neutral" arbi-
trator must under most rules be a national of a third country. 57 It is gener-
ally believed to be unlikely that an arbitrator who is not an American
lawyer would listen with particular sympathy to claims or defenses based
on essentially regulatory statutes such as the securities or antitrust laws,
even where the contract by its terms is governed by American law. 58
"See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P.
Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396
F.2d 710 (9th Cir. 1968). See also M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION §§ 19.02, 19.02a (Supp. 1981).
"417 U.S. 506 (1974).
"417 U.S. at 515.
"P. Ehrenhaft, supra n.50 at 1199-1200.
"See, e.g., ICC Rules, supra n.42, art. 2(6); cf. UNCITRAL Rules, supra n.41, art. 6(4).
"F. Higgins, W. Brown and P. Roach, supra n.47 at 1040.
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On the other hand, resort to arbitration may affect the respective substan-
tive rights and duties of the parties in a manner which was not originally
contemplated. For example, it is possible that the plaintiff in Scherk, in
acquiring the securities as to which fraud was subsequently alleged, relied
in part upon the protections afforded by the anti-fraud provisions of our
securities laws. Assuming this to have been the case, the Supreme Court
may have effectively changed the balance struck in the commercial contract
by forcing the plaintiff to arbitration.
Another area in which the substantive rights of the parties may be
affected by the use of arbitration is that of preliminary relief. American
courts have split on the question whether the New York Convention pre-
cludes the granting of pre-award attachments or other preliminary relief,
5 9
although it would seem clear that such relief is available to the extent that it
is demonstrably consistent with the intent of the arbitration agreement.
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For this reason, the principal international rules of arbitration specifically
permit either party to apply to a court for interim relief.6' In the absence of
such provisions in the arbitration agreement or in rules incorporated by
reference in that agreement, the parties might well be required to seek
interim relief from the arbitrators rather than the courts. To the extent that
the arbitration agreement permits the entry of interim awards, such awards
would under the Convention be enforceable through the courts; 62 however,
the delays involved in appointing the arbitrators and then obtaining an
interim award might well render the issue moot. In many international dis-
putes, a problem of particular concern is the availability of pre-award
attachment, since delay in attaching assets may enable the respondent to
remove the assets to a jurisdiction in which enforcement will be much more
difficult, either under substantive law or by virtue of bank secrecy or limited
rights of discovery.
"Compare McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032 (3d Cir. 1974) and
I.T.A.D. Associates, Inc. v. Podar Brothers, 636 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1981) with Carolina Power &
Light Co. v. Uranex, 451 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Cal. 1977) and Atlas Chartering Services v.
World Trade Group, 453 F. Supp. 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Note, Pre-Award Attachment
Under the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign ArbitralA wards, 21
VA. J. INT'L L. 785 (1981).
'
0See Guiness-Harp Corp. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1980). While
this case was governed by the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act rather than the Con-
vention, the result would appear to be the same under the latter.
"'Article 26(3) of the UNCITRAL Rules, supra n.41, provides as follows:
A request for interim measures addressed by any party to a judicial authority shall not be
deemed incompatible with the agreement to arbitrate, or as a waiver of that agreement.
See also article 8(5) of the ICC Rules, supra n.42.
12 The New York Convention does not distinguish between interim and final awards. How-
ever, article V(I)(c) permits refusal of recognition and enforcement of an award which "con-
tains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration." Unless the
agreement of the parties, including any rules incorporated by reference, clearly contemplates
the issuance of interim awards, such an award might conceivably be viewed as a decision "on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration." Cf. Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI
Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 958-961 (S.D. Ohio W.D. 1981).
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3. ENFORCEMENT QUESTIONS
At common law, it was difficult to obtain judicial enforcement of either
an agreement to arbitrate or an arbitral award once rendered. This resist-
ance reflected a hostility of the courts to any effort by private parties to oust
them of jurisdiction.63 Other legal systems, while in some cases recognizing
the validity of arbitration agreements and awards, have tended to discrimi-
nate in various ways against foreign as opposed to domestic awards. 64
With respect to those countries which have become parties to the New
York Convention, these problems have now been largely eliminated insofar
as international commercial arbitration is concerned. Nonetheless, there
remain a number of commercially important countries which are not yet
party to the Convention, 65 with the result that there are doubts as to
enforceability in the courts of those countries of arbitral awards rendered
elsewhere and vice versa.
In addressing questions of enforcement, it is appropriate to note that
arbitration has a clear advantage over judicial resolution where foreign
governments are parties to or involved in the dispute. It has been held that
the agreement by a foreign government to submit to arbitration in the
United States constitutes a waiver of the defense of sovereign immunity in
any action to compel arbitration or to enforce the eventual award.66 More-
over, under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, such a waiver cannot be
withdrawn except in accordance with its original terms.67 Properly utilized,
these rules can enable careful counsel to avoid some of the risks of the
protracted procedural maneuvering which tend frequently to be a part of a
commercial dispute with a foreign government. 68
The use of arbitration as a means of dispute resolution can also avoid
some of the procedural complexities arising out of the act of state doctrine.
The policy considerations underlying that doctrine are not in any way
applicable to proceedings before arbitrators and, since enforcement of an
arbitral award does not in any case require the enforcing court to pass on
the validity of acts of a foreign sovereign but only to enter judgment on an
award properly rendered, the doctrine should not be a bar to enforcement
under any circumstances. 69
"
3L. Quigley, supra n.44 at 1049.
" d at 1051.
"P. Ehrenhaft, supra n.50 at 1219.
'See Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 505 F. Supp.
141 (D.D.C. 1981); see also G. Kahale, Arbitration and Choice-of-Law Clauses as Waivers of
Jurisdictional Immunity, 14 J. INT'L L. & POL. 29, 40 (1981).
'28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). To the same effect, see § 9(1) of the U.K. State Immunity Act,
supra n.30.
"Care must be taken, however, to ensure that government officials executing contracts have
the legal authority to bind their governmental principal to arbitration. Under the laws of some
countries, government contracts are not arbitrable, at least absent express statutory authoriza-
tion. See G. DELAUME, TRANSNATIONAL CONTRACTS, Ch. XIII, § 13.05 (1980).
"See generally Note, International Arbitration and the Inapplicability of the Act of State Doc-
trine, 14 J. INT'L L. & POL. 65 (1981).
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Unfortunately, in the only case in which this particular issue appears thus
far to have arisen, a federal district court held that the act of state doctrine,
where applicable to a dispute governed by an arbitration agreement, would
preclude judicial enforcement of that agreement. 70 However, this decision
was subsequently vacated and seems unlikely to be followed.7'
II. Some Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution
Stimulated by a growing recognition of the counter-productive features
of formal adjudicatory procedures, a number of groups within the legal
profession have begun to concentrate on a search for better ways to resolve
legal disputes. Added momentum was given to this movement by the high-
ly successful experiment conducted in connection with the TRW/Telecredit
patent infringement litigation, in which counsel for the parties structured an
informal "mini-trial" before a neutral adviser with management participa-
tion. That experiment, which has been described at length elsewhere,
72
pointed the way toward future development of such procedures.
Without rehearsing all that has been said on this subject, it will nonethe-
less be helpful to summarize for purposes of this discussion the basic objec-
tives of such alternative dispute resolution procedures and the principal
structural variations which appear to be possible.
A. Basic Objectives
The list of the principal objectives which have motivated the search for
alternative procedures is, not surprisingly, a mirror image of the list of
problems which have been identified as inherent in the conventional
procedures.
1. MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION
By bringing senior management personnel into the proceeding in a direct
way, the alternative procedures seek to accomplish several things. First, the
managers are exposed to the perspectives and arguments of the other party
to the dispute. This enables them not only to make an informed business
judgment as to the merits of the dispute but also to form an independent
opinion as to the probable outcome of the litigation. By giving both parties
a better appreciation of the strengths and weaknesses of their respective
"'Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F.
Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980).
'Before the district court's decision in LIAMCO reached the court of appeals the case was
settled. However, in light of the potentially serious impact which the case might have had on
international commercial arbitration had the district court's decision been permitted to stand,
several groups appeared before the court of appeals as amici curiae and moved that the district
court's decision be vacated. That motion was granted. Note, supra n.69 at 69 n. 15.
"E. Green, J. Marks and R. Olson, supra n. I at 501-511; see also E. Green, The Mini-Trial
Approach to Complex Litigation in Center for Public Resources, Dispute Management at pp. I-
A.I el seq. (looseleaf 1981).
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positions, the procedure aims to bring the negotiating positions of the par-
ties closer together and thus to facilitate the settlement process.
In addition, the mandatory participation of senior managers on each side
helps to ensure that the parties will view the dispute from a commercial
perspective and that the talents of those skilled in the process of commercial
negotiation will be brought to bear on the search for a mutually acceptable
resolution. If in the process the corporate managers find a challenge in the
search for a resolution, rather than vindication, the probability of a quick,
efficient and mutually satisfactory resolution is enhanced. The likelihood is
also increased that the eventual resolution will form a basis for the reestab-
lishment of a good commercial relationship between the parties.
The increasing prevalence of long-term contractual and other legal rela-
tionships in international commerce lends particular urgency to the need
for procedures which will enable the parties to resolve a dispute without
terminating the underlying business relationship or destroying the mutual
confidence on which it is based. A prime example of such a business rela-
tionship is to be found in the many joint ventures formed in recent years
between American and foreign entities. In many cases, the investments of
the parties can be protected only if the venture can be preserved as a going
concern. In this situation it is clearly in the interest of both parties to utilize
procedures designed to maximize the probability that any dispute will be
resolved in a manner which permits the business relationship to continue.
The same observation would apply with respect to other long-term contrac-
tual relationships.
2. NARROWING OF ISSUES
The alternative procedures also attempt to minimize the diversion of time
and energy to procedural and other ancillary issues by focusing the atten-
tion of the parties on the main issues in dispute. This is generally achieved
by such measures as permitting only very limited discovery and limiting the
presentations to be made by the parties to their best claims and defenses.
As a general matter, of course, this will be mutually acceptable only on the
understanding that the parties remain free to raise additional issues in the
course of the formal proceedings in the event the abbreviated procedures
fail to produce a settlement.
3. ENCOURAGEMENT OF FREE DIALOGUE
The jealousy with which parties to litigation frequently guard not only
the facts within their possession but even the legal theories underlying their
claims sometimes makes it extremely difficult for one party to gain a clear
understanding of the other party's perspective until the case goes to trial.
The alternative procedures attempt to deal with this problem by encourag-
ing a free dialogue not only through the participation of senior corporate
managers having full authority to settle a dispute but also through ground
International Commercial Disputes
rules which prohibit the use of statements made during the course of those
procedures as evidence in any subsequent formal proceedings.
B. Structural Variations
There are many ways in which alternative procedures can be structured.
As a general matter, the choice of a particular structure will depend both on
the nature of the dispute, in particular on whether it turns largely on techni-
cal issues or other questions of fact, and on the legal framework within
which it is to be established, including such variables as the forum within
which any formal proceedings can be brought and the status of any pro-
ceedings which have already been initiated. Without attempting to exhaust
the available possibilities, we will summarize briefly the principal variations
which have been suggested,73 under the somewhat artificial headings of
non-binding, semi-binding and binding procedures.
1. NON-BINDING PROCEDURES
Non-binding procedures are formulated in such a way as to be purely
advisory in character. This means that they are totally independent of any
formal proceedings either pending or subsequent, and that no statements,
discussions or conclusions made at or arising out of the informal procedures
can be introduced as evidence in formal proceedings. Apart from these
common elements, the non-binding procedures may take several forms.
a. "Mini-trial" with Neutral Advisor
The procedure used in the TRW/Telecredit dispute involved a structured
presentation to a carefully selected former judge with expertise in the field
of patents, to which the dispute related. Senior management personnel of
each party participated in the proceedings in an essentially passive role.
After completion of the proceedings, the management participants met
without presence of counsel to consider possible resolutions of the dispute.
While the TRW/Telecredit litigation was in fact settled at this stage, the
next step would have been for the neutral advisor to render an opinion as to
the probable outcome of the dispute if it were to proceed to trial. Both
parties were precluded by agreement from putting that opinion into evi-
dence at the trial. The agreement of the parties also stipulated to a sixty-
day "cooling-off period" following the rendering of the neutral advisor's
opinion before the pending litigation could be recommended.
b. Confidential Mediation or Conciliation
This procedure resembles a kind of shuttle diplomacy in which the neu-
tral advisor acts as a confidential go-between for the parties. The basic idea
"The non-exhaustive list of possibilities set forth below is based in substantial pan on the
variations suggested by Associate Professor Eric Green of the Boston University School of
Law. See E. Green, supra n.72.
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of this approach is to enable the parties to communicate to the intermediary
their best negotiating positions and concerns, with the understanding that
the intermediary will not reveal that information to the other party but will
attempt to structure a resolution which is acceptable to both.
Again, it would appear essential that the parties agree to preserve the
confidentiality of this process and, in particular, agree not to introduce any
portion of the discussions in evidence in any subsequent formal
proceedings.
c. Contingent Settlement Agreement
This variation, which is really a negotiating structure, involves an effort
by the parties to reach agreement as to the monetary amounts which would
be owed assuming each of several possible outcomes of a trial. The theory
of this approach is that, by quantifying their respective potential exposures
and recoveries, the parties will narrow the range of possible outcomes and
thus enhance the probability of developing a zone of compromise.
2. SEMI-BINDING PROCEDURES
Unlike the non-binding procedures, some alternative procedures have
been suggested which, though not a part of the formal proceedings, are
related to the formal proceedings in a way which gives them more "teeth."
These may, for lack of a better term, be called "semi-binding" procedures.
a. "Mini-Trial" with Penalties
One option which has been suggested is the use of a "mini-trial" like that
employed in the TRW/Telecredit dispute, with the added element of a stip-
ulated penalty to be paid by the party whose position is rejected by the
neutral advisor if that party refuses to accept the neutral advisor's opinion
and then loses in the ensuing formal proceedings. Apart from this penalty,
however, the neutral advisor's opinion is strictly advisory, and neither the
opinion nor any of the proceedings of the "mini-trial" can be introduced in,
evidence in the formal proceedings.
b. "Mini-Trial" with Proceedings Admissible
Another variation contemplates resort to the "mini-trial" before a neutral
advisor, again similar to the procedure used in the TRW/Telecredit dis-
pute, except that the opinion of the neutral advisor, once rendered, would
be admissible by either party in subsequent formal proceedings. In this
version, the advisor's opinion would not be conclusive on any of the issues
involved but would carry such probative weight as the trier of fact might
consider appropriate under general principles of proof. The parties would
presumably be foreclosed, whether by agreement or by inference, from
challenging the credentials of the neutral advisor as an "expert" for eviden-
tiary purposes.
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3. BINDING PROCEDURES
The use of binding procedures would require a willingness on the part of
both parties to renounce completely at least some of the opportunities for
procedural maneuvering and delay which are inherent in a full-blown judi-
cial proceeding. Under a binding procedure, the parties would agree to
give conclusive effect to the outcome of the alternative proceeding, at least
to the extent implicit in the procedure selected.
a. "Mini-Trial" Before Special Master
One type of binding procedure would involve the conduct of a "mini-
trial" before a referee or special master appointed by a court having juris-
diction over the dispute. In this variation, the parties would presumably
have to stipulate in advance, and obtain court approval of, limited discov-
ery and a narrowing of the issues to those which are central to the dispute.
To the extent that the opinion of the special master involved conclusions of
law, it would be subject to review by the court; as to findings of fact, how-
ever, it would be conclusive on the parties.74
The proceedings before the special master would, again by stipulation,
incorporate the necessary provisions for participation by senior manage-
ment personnel of both parties and for periods of consultation both before
and after the rendering of the special master's opinion. It would thus
attempt to achieve the objectives of alternative procedures within the con-
text of a court approved, expedited proceeding which would lead quickly to
judgment in the event of an inability of the parties to settle the dispute prior
to that time.
b. Modified Arbitration
An alternative procedure of the binding variety can also be structured
within the framework of arbitration proceedings. Indeed, the arbitral
framework affords the parties great flexibility which will permit them to
define the scope and mechanics of the proceeding so as to accomplish the
main objectives of the alternative procedures and still lead to a final adjudi-
cation in the event that a negotiated settlement is not reached.
7"The weight to be accorded to the conclusions of a special master, referee or "expert" in the
civil-law sense will of course be determined by reference to the applicable rules of procedure.
Rule 53(e)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
The effect of a master's report is the same whether or not the parties have consented to the
reference; but, when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be final, only
questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
While it has been said that U.S. courts have inherent authority to appoint impartial experts to
provide guidance to the court, and such persons are sometimes referred to as "masters," their
function does not extend to making findings of fact or rulings of law. See 9 C. Wright and A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2602 at 778-779 (1971); see also Danville Tobacco
Ass'n v. Bryant-Buckner Associates, Inc., 333 F.2d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 1964). As to the practice
relating to use of "experts" by civil-law courts, see infra n.85 and accompanying text.
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Where the parties conclude the arbitration agreement after the dispute
has arisen, rather than as part of the underlying commercial agreement, it is
normal for the parties to draw up "terms of reference." Such an agreement
defines the issues to be resolved by the arbitrators and the procedures to be
employed, and the parties have wide latitude to develop a structure which
meets their specific needs. Even where well-developed rules are used, they
leave to the parties and the arbitrators a wide range of procedural issues,
including such matters as discovery and the manner in which evidence is to
be presented, and can in any case be varied by agreement of the parties.
This being the case, nothing would preclude parties who are prepared to
use alternative procedures on a binding basis from drafting terms of refer-
ence or stipulations defining narrowly the issues which are central to the
dispute and limiting the scope of discovery and the presentation of evidence
in whatever ways the parties consider appropriate. The provisions which
might be made with respect to management participation would be limited
only by the imaginations of the parties and their counsel. At some risk of
suggesting too radical a departure from tradition, the authors perceive no
insurmountable obstacle to each party's designating as an arbitrator one of
its senior corporate managers, with the third arbitrator to be chosen by
mutual agreement or, failing such agreement, as otherwise provided. The
arbitration agreement would presumably provide that, in the absence of
agreement of any two of the arbitrators on a single award, the award would
be rendered by the neutral third arbitrator alone.
Under this variation, the parties would be foreclosed from challenging
the award, either as to findings of fact or as to conclusions of law, except
through invocation of one of the defenses permitted under applicable
domestic law and, where also applicable, the New York Convention. In
this connection, it should be noted that Article V(1)(a) of the Convention
permits the courts of a Contracting State to refuse recognition and enforce-
ment of the award where the arbitration agreement "is not valid under the
law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereon,
under the law of the country where the award was made." On the other
hand, Article V(1)(d) permits such a refusal where the "composition of the
arbitral authority or arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance
with the law of the country where the arbitration took place." The latter
provision would appear to make it clear that an agreement of the parties as
to composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure would
supersede any inconsistent rules contained in the law of the country of
arbitration.
III. Special Considerations in the International Context
Application of any of the procedures outlined above to the resolution of
domestic commercial disputes obviously involves a number of issues which
must be addressed by counsel for the parties in order to maximize the
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chances for a negotiated settlement without creating unintended adverse
consequences. Most of these issues will need to be addressed in the same
manner in the case of an international dispute. However, there are certain
considerations which are unique to the international context and which
should be borne in mind in structuring alternative procedures for the reso-
lution of international disputes.
A. Problems Under National Laws
That a foreign national is, in most cases, a party to an international dis-
pute will probably mean either that any eventual judicial proceedings
would have to be brought in the foreign country or that any judgment ren-
dered in this country or a third country may have to be enforced through
the courts in the foreign national's home country. In either event, the laws
of the latter country may have a material impact upon the effectiveness of
the alternative procedure selected.
1. ENFORCEABILITY OF AGREEMENTS ON ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES
As a general proposition, the importance of the enforceability of agree-
ments for the establishment of alternative procedures increases as one tra-
verses the spectrum from non-binding to binding procedures. Since non-
binding procedures depend essentially on the continued willingness of both
parties to participate, the enforceability of an agreement to participate in
such procedures will generally be largely academic. The principal excep-
tion to this generalization relates to that aspect of the non-binding proce-
dures which contemplates the exclusion of the opinion of the neutral
advisor, as well as any other evidence obtained solely through the alterna-
tive procedures, from introduction into evidence in subsequent formal pro-
ceedings. Because of the critical importance of confidentiality to the success
of non-binding procedures, counsel for each party will probably want to
verify with local counsel in the other country involved the assumption that
the courts of that country would enforce the exclusionary agreement.
In this connection, it should be noted that jury trials are largely unknown
in commercial cases in most countries, and the only party from whom evi-
dence is being withheld under an exclusionary agreement is therefore the
court itself. Particularly where important public interests are involved, such
an agreement might conceivably be viewed by some courts as an agreement
to withhold information required by the court in contravention of the pub-
lic policy of the forum state. 75
"There is a dearth of authority as to whether an agreement not to introduce evidence pro-
duced in the course of non-binding procedures would be enforceable even in American courts
under all circumstances. While it would seem likely that an agreed exclusionary rule would be
honored in most cases, that result would seem to flow primarily from the policies underlying
the evidentiary rule excluding evidence of compromises, offers to compromise and conduct or
statements made in compromise negotiations, namely, the policy of aiding the compromise
and settlement of disputes. See FED. R. EVID. 408; see also 2 J. WEINSTEIN and M. BERGER,
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With respect to semi-binding procedures, if it is anticipated that subse-
quent judicial proceedings might take place in a foreign country, the law of
that country should be reviewed with respect to the enforceability of an
exclusionary agreement or the admissibility of an expert's opinion, depend-
ing on which approach is selected. In addition, there may be a question as
to the enforceability of a penalty clause, at least in common law jurisdic-
tions, unless the amount of the penalty can be shown to be a genuine esti-
mate of probable damages arising from failure to comply with the agreed
procedures. 76
Except to the extent that they contemplate the use of an arbitral frame-
work, binding procedures seem likely to create the most significant
problems under various national laws. Where procedures governing the
conduct of a mini-trial before a special master or expert are approved by a
court of the forum country, enforceability of the resulting decision in that
country should not become an issue so long as the court has not exceeded
its authority under applicable rules of civil procedure. By and large, how-
ever, courts would not be empowered to approve an arrangement giving
conclusive effect to determinations of law embodied in the decision of a
special master or expert.77 Moreover, to the extent that the procedure
approved by the court resulted in a significant limitation of either party's
right to raise claims or defenses or to present evidence in support of either,
problems might be encountered in enforcing the resulting judgment in a
foreign country, on grounds that the proceedings were not regular under the
law of the original forum country.78
Most of these problems can be avoided if the alternative procedure is cast
in the form of an arbitration, particularly where the foreign state is a party
to the New York Convention. Even then, however, there is at least one
potential problem which should be noted. It has been suggested above that
one means of bringing senior corporate managers into an arbitral proceed-
ing would be to designate them as party-appointed arbitrators. However,
many foreign lawyers, particularly those from the civil law traditions, con-
tinue to adhere to the theory that even party-appointed arbitrators must
enjoy an independence appropriate to their quasi-judicial function. 79 Lack
EVIDENCE at p. 408-17 (looseleaf 1980). However, difficult issues might be raised if, for exam-
ple, a crucial third-party witness who appeared at a mini-trial later became "unavailable" for
purposes of the rule permitting introduction of prior testimony, statements against interest or.
other statements notwithstanding the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EViD. 804.
"See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1057-1059 (1964).
"See n.74 supra; cf. n.87 infra.
'"Under French Law, failure of a foreign court to comply with its own procedures has, at
least until recently, been a defense to enforcement of the resulting judgment in French courts.
See P. HERZOG, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 590-591 (1967). The American rule, as set
forth in Hilton v. Guyot, supra n.23, requires as a condition to enforcement of a foreign judg-
ment that "there has been opportunity for afull andfair trial abroad before a court of compe-
tent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings... " 159 U.S. at 202
(emphasis supplied). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, Comment c
(1969). See also A. von Mehren and D. Trautman, supra n.20 at 1662-65.
'"F. Higgins, W. Brown and P. Roach, supra n.47 at 1043-44.
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of independence may constitute a basis for an allegation of prejudice which
might, in turn, provide a defense against enforcement of the resulting arbi-
tral award.8 0
2. COMPATIBILITY WITH LOCAL
JUDICIAL PROCEDURES
In the event that judicial proceedings are pending before a foreign court
when the parties agree to pursue alternative procedures, the parties will
have to determine whether those procedures will be accepted by the foreign
court as compatible with its own procedures. In this connection, several
points should be noted.
First, discovery procedures as practiced by American lawyers are both
alien and offensive to most foreign courts.8' In civil law systems, the pro-
cess of discovery as we know it is carried out by a judicial officer as part of
the evidence-gathering process and is not separate and distinct from what
we would regard as the trial.82 To the extent that the agreement of the
parties on a "mini-trial" type of procedure depends on the existence of
some sort of private "discovery" procedures, however limited, a foreign
court may regard this as an intrusion into its function. Even in the English
judicial system, which perhaps comes closest to the American in terms of
the discovery process, discovery is limited to the production of documents
to be used as evidence at trial, as opposed to documents which may be
useful in developing lines of inquiry, and depositions are permitted only
'Language in the plurality opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Common-
wealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968), reh. denied, 393 U.S.
1112 (1969) appears to suggest that arbitrators are to be held to the same standards as judges in
terms of avoidance not only of bias but of the appearance of bias. 393 U.S. at 150. However,
the concurring justices expressly rejected that implication, stating that "arbitrators are not
automatically disqualified by a business relationship with the parties before them if both par-
ties are informed of the relationship in advance, or if they are unaware of the facts but the
relationship is trivial." Id The latter standard appears to have been adopted by the lower
courts. See International Produce, Inc. v. A/S Rosshavet, 638 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1981); see also
Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948 (S.D. Ohio W.D. 1981).
The New York Convention does not specifically address the issue of impartiality, but article
V(l)(d) permits Contracting States to refuse enforcement of an award upon proof that
The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance
with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the
law of the country where the arbitration took place;....
Article 2(4) of the ICC Rules, supra n.42, provides expressly that a party-appointed arbitrator
"shall be independent of the party nominating him." This rule may impose a higher standard
of impartiality in cases where the ICC Rules are adopted by the parties than would otherwise
govern under applicable law. See, Fertilizer Corp. of India v. IDI Management, Inc., supra,
517 F. Supp. at 954. On the other hand, article 9 of the UNCITRAL Rules, supra n.41, simply
requires disclosure by a prospective arbitrator of "any circumstances likely to give rise to justi-
fiable doubts as to his impartiality or independence."
"See J. Carter, Obtaining Foreign Discovery and Evidencefor Use in Litigation in the United
States. Existing Rules and Procedures, 13 INT'L LAW. 5, 5-7 (1979).
"
21d ; see also J. Borel and S. Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in
Francefor Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35, 35-37 (1979).
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very rarely.83 Even assuming that private, voluntary discovery is allowed by
the foreign court, which is not a foregone conclusion, 84 the agreement of the
parties should be precise as to the kinds of discovery to be permitted. Since
foreign lawyers' expectations as to the evidence-gathering process will
undoubtedly be shaped by their experience with their own procedures, the
alternative procedures should be discussed and defined in detail.
A second point worthy of note is that the mini-trial procedure is in many
respects analogous to a procedure under which civil law courts utilize neu-
tral experts in civil litigation. 85 Under that procedure, a court may, with the
agreement of the parties, at the request of one of them or on its own motion,
appoint an expert to make an investigation within a defined scope and
report his conclusions to the court.86
The proceedings before such an expert are generally highly informal.
There are no rules of evidence and the parties are generally not permitted
to engage in extensive discovery, although the expert is free to draw infer-
ences from a failure of a party to provide evidence. The expert generally
conducts the inquiry through a series of meetings with the parties, who are
free to submit documents and explain their versions of the facts and their
underlying legal theories. While the task of the expert is theoretically lim-
ited to fact finding, issues of law are almost inevitably raised.
Upon completion of the investigation and the meetings with the parties,
the expert drafts preliminary findings for submission to the parties. The
parties then have an opportunity to comment on those findings and to
attempt to persuade the expert to change them as appropriate. After com-
"
3See L. Collins, Opportunitiesfor and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in Englandfor Use in
Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 27, 27-28 (1979); see also P. Pettit and C. Styles,
The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws,
37 Bus. LAW. 697, 699-704 (1982); and see generally, Note, Discovery in Great Britain. The
Evidence (Proceedings in Other Jurisdictions) Act, II CORNELL INT'L L.J. 323 (1978).
1Article 17 of The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, [1972] 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, provides that evidence may be
taken, without compulsion, of nationals of the state in which it is taken or of nationals of third
states only with the permission of a competent authority of the state in which the evidence is
taken and where certain other requirements are met. Article 16 permits the taking by a diplo-
matic officer or a consular agent, without compulsion, of nationals of the state which he repre-
sents without such permission, but the article further provides that a Contracting State may
declare that even such evidence may be taken in its territory only with the permission of the
appropriate authority of the declaring state. Those provisions reflect a view, which is strongly
held in some civil law jurisdictions, that "proceedings related to civil and commercial litigation
should be under the control of a judicial officer and not be left to the parties without supervi-
sion." B. Herzog, Current Developments: The 1980 French Law on Documents and Information,
75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382, 385 (1981).
"'For a concise comparative summary of the procedures utilized by the courts of France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States see G. WHITE, THE USE OF
EXPERTS BY INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 15-33 (1965). A more detailed description of the
French procedure is contained in P. Herzog, supra n.78 at 347-355 (1967). The discussion in
the text is based primarily on experience with the Belgian system, which is generally similar to
that used in France.
'"While American courts are empowered to appoint and utilize special masters or referees in
much the same fashion as the courts of civil law countries, this procedure is relatively rarely
used. See n.74 supra.
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pletion of this process, the expert submits a final report to the court. While
any conclusions of law implicit in the expert's findings are subject to review
by the court, determinations of fact are in practice very difficult to overturn,
even by presentation of expert evidence to the contrary. 87
Where judicial proceedings on a dispute are likely to be instituted before
a foreign court whose procedures include the use of experts along the fore-
going lines, care must be taken to ensure that any opinions rendered by the
neutral advisor will in fact be accorded the intended weight in such pro-
ceedings. In particular, in agreeing to a semi-binding procedure under
which the conclusions of the expert are to be admissible in subsequent for-
mal proceedings, an American party should be aware of the nearly-conclu-
sive effect given in practice to the opinion of a mutually-agreed expert by
some courts.
B. Relationship to Arbitration
In light of the increasing use of arbitration as a means of resolving inter-
national commercial disputes, it is appropriate to address the relationship
between some of the alternative procedures and the operation of an arbitra-
tion agreement. If not carefully designed, alternative procedures may
undermine the effectiveness of the arbitration agreement if arbitration is
eventually required.
On the other hand, incorporation of the alternative procedures into a
properly structured arbitration agreement may offer the best means of
avoiding some of the problems and complications arising out of differences
in national laws and judicial procedures. Indeed it is important to bear in
mind that, notwithstanding the existence of well-developed arbitration rules
and related standard arbitration clauses, the concepts and principles of
arbitration are inherently flexible and intended to enable the parties to
design their own procedures. When we speak of "alternative procedures,"
therefore, we do not mean to suggest that those procedures represent an
alternative to arbitration, but rather that they should be considered as alter-
native structures for the arbitral process.
1. EFFECT OF ALTERNATIVE PROCEDURES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
As has been noted above, the mere existence of an agreement to arbitrate
does not mean that there is a well-defined procedure for the appointment of
arbitrators or for going forward with the proceedings where one of the par-
ties seeks to avoid arbitration. This gap is usually filled either by reference
"In theory, the court is not bound by the report of the expert even as to issues of fact; the
tendency of the French courts to accept the results of an expertise without question, notwith-
standing the theory, has been aptly described as making an expertise "somewhat of a risk".
See P. Herzog, supra n.78 at 354-355; see also G. White, supra n.85 at 21. As to the weight
accorded by American courts to the views of court-appointed experts, see Danville Tobacco
Assn. v. Bryant-Buckner Associates, Inc., supra n.74.
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to specific institutional rules agreed to by the parties or by special ad hoc
rules incorporated in the agreement to arbitrate. The institutional rules, in
particular, contain carefully designed procedures to ensure that neither
party will be in a position to frustrate the objectives of the arbitration agree-
ment by delay or refusal to participate in the arbitration.88
Where the parties seek to provide for the use of alternative non-binding
or semi-binding procedures before either party resorts to full arbitration, it
is crucial that the agreement relating to the alternative procedures not
undermine the provisions of the arbitration agreement. This could occur,
for example, if the provisions for initial use of an alternative procedure
precluded either party from commencing more formal final arbitral proce-
dures until the alternative procedures had been completed, without making
adequate provision as to the limitation of the time allowed for the alterna-
tive procedures. Since arbitration is a purely contractual remedy, there is a
risk that the completion of alternative procedures might be viewed as a con-
dition precedent to the obligation to final arbitration. Even a simple provi-
sion obligating the parties to negotiate in good faith prior to resorting to
final arbitration may undermine the enforceability of the agreement to arbi-
trate; a court before which an action was brought to enforce an arbitration
agreement or an arbitral award rendered without the participation of a
reluctant party might feel constrained to determine in the first instance
whether the party seeking enforcement had complied with its obligation to
negotiate in good faith.
2. AFFIRMATIVE USE OF THE ARBITRAL FRAMEWORK
The incorporation into an arbitration agreement of provisions for the use
of alternative procedures may be of substantial assistance in ensuring that
the alternative procedures will work as intended and will not produce unan-
ticipated results. This consequence flows both from the latitude afforded
the parties in construing arbitral procedures and from the international pro-
tections against judicial intervention provided by the New York
Convention.
For example, it would be possible to design arbitration agreements under
which the demand for arbitration would automatically trigger preliminary
non-binding or semi-binding procedures prior to the appointment of arbi-
trators. If properly structured, such provisions would not only insulate
those procedures from judicial interference but also enable the party invok-
ing the alternative procedures to obtain the assistance of the courts in com-
pelling a recalcitrant opponent to go forward with those procedures as an
integral part of the arbitration.
"'As to the importance of provisions of this kind, see P. Ehrenhaft, supra n.50 at 1202 n. 60,
recounting the history of the four-year delay encountered in the appointment of arbitrators in
the proceedings between Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and the government of Libya.
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Ideally, the provisions of such an arbitration agreement should be incor-
porated into the underlying contract. While the provisions for arbitration
tend to receive very little attention in the negotiation of a commercial
agreement, there is a very real advantage in trying to work out such provi-
sions, particularly relating to the use of alternative procedures, in the
atmosphere of good will surrounding the striking of a deal rather than in
the acrimony of a mature dispute.
C. Foreign Governmental Involvement
In light of the increasing involvement of foreign governments in commer-
cial disputes, both as principals and as actors in the events leading up to the
dispute, it is useful to note some of the special problems involved in struc-
turing alternative dispute resolution procedures under such circumstances.
1. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AS PARTY TO THE DISPUTE
The use of alternative procedures for the resolution of disputes to which
foreign governments are party involves some obvious practical problems.
In the first place, it may be extremely difficult to obtain the direct participa-
tion in the proceedings of a government official having sufficient authority
to enable the procedures to work. It is of the essence of the alternative
procedures that the participating managers have full authority to resolve
the dispute and, moreover, that they be motivated to do so.
As is well known to anyone with experience in negotiating commercial
arrangements with foreign governmental agencies, the decision-making
process within such organizations tends to be both bureaucratized and frag-
mented. It is frequently difficult to identify any single individual below the
ministerial level who has full authority to speak for the government. In
some circumstances the issue is not necessarily one of legal authority but
rather of whether the government official has the necessary political back-
ing to enable him to proceed with confidence to conclude settlement
arrangements.
Where it does not appear possible to obtain the active participation of a
government representative capable of acting on his own best judgment,
there is a real question whether use of alternative procedures is either possi-
ble or desirable from the standpoint of the private party. If the representa-
tive in fact has only a very limited latitude within which to negotiate
settlement arrangements, the use of alternative procedures may not only
prove ineffective but, by encouraging a reasonably open and candid discus-
sion of the strengths and weaknesses of the respective positions of the par-
ties, may convey to the governmental party a sense of weakness in the
position of the private party which in turn may prolong efforts to resolve
the dispute.
Another problem is more mechanical in nature. Many of the alternative
procedures depend for their workability upon agreements or stipulations
relating to such matters as the use of the opinion of the neutral advisor and
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information emerging from the informal proceedings in any subsequent
formal proceedings. However, an agency or instrumentality of a foreign
government which is a direct party to a commercial dispute may not have
the authority on behalf of the government as a whole to enter into agree-
ments concerning the conduct of litigation. Uncertainty on this issue may
make it difficult for counsel for the private party to be confident that any
such agreements will be binding on the foreign government should the
alternative procedures not succeed.
2. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT AS AN INTERESTED PARTY
Even where the foreign government is not a party to the commercial dis-
pute, it may have a direct interest in the manner in which the dispute is
resolved and, indeed, may have the regulatory authority to determine
whether or not a commercial resolution can be implemented. This situation
might exist, for example, in the case of a dispute between two parties to a
joint venture in a foreign country in which agreements for the formation of
such ventures require government approval. An agreed resolution of a dis-
pute arising under such an agreement might be considered an amendment
to the original agreement requiring further governmental approval. Even a
dispute relating to a simple sales transaction may fit into this category if, for
example, the resolution agreed to by the parties involves payments which
require approvals or licenses under foreign exchange control laws and
regulations.
Even where its interest in the dispute is relatively tangential, the foreign
government may prove to be more of an obstacle to resolution than either
of the direct parties to the dispute. Or one party may be in a position to use
the government in a strategy designed to "whipsaw" its adversary into con-
tinuing renegotiation of the settlement on increasingly unfavorable terms.
In either case, the ability of the government to block a proposed settlement
may undermine the effectiveness of alternative dispute resolution
procedures.
There would appear to be two ways of dealing with this situation. One
would be to try to bring the government into the settlement discussions.
Unfortunately, this requires the government to devote resources to a dis-
pute in which it is not directly involved and as to which it would probably
prefer to preserve its options in any case.
Another approach would be to cast the provisions for the alternative pro-
cedure in the form of an arbitration agreement, structured so that the even-
tual resolution would be embodied in an arbitral award. This would make
it much more difficult for government regulatory authorities to decline to
permit the implementation of the result arrived at, particularly if the coun-
try in question were a party to the New York Convention.89
"The Convention does not permit the courts of a Contracting State to refuse recognition or
enforcement of an award subject to the Convention on grounds that the award is not in accord-
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IV. Some Contractual Considerations
It seems apparent from the foregoing discussion that, at least at present,
use of the arbitral framework offers the most promising approach for the
application of alternative procedures to international commercial disputes.
In order to clarify some of the structural issues which would have to be
addressed in formulating an arbitration agreement incorporating such pro-
cedures, it is useful to outline the principal provisions which would have to
be included.
A. Provisions Common to All Types of Alternative Procedure
Certain provisions would be required regardless of the type of alternative
procedure selected. These would have the primary objective of integrating
the alternative procedures with the more conventional arbitration proce-
dures, if any, to which the parties may resort if the alternative procedures
fail.
1. PROVISIONS FOR INITIATION OF PROCEDURES
The agreement should clearly define the sequence of events which would
follow a demand for arbitration. Where the alternative procedures selected
are non-binding or semi-binding, these provisions should clearly require
the parties to pursue the alternative procedures prior to resort to regular
arbitration or judicial remedies. In order to help ensure compliance, con-
sideration might be given to clauses which would require payment by a
non-participating party of liquidated damages, whether fixed in amount or
defined as a portion or all of the other party's legal expenses in any ensuing
formal proceeding or in any proceeding instituted by the first party in con-
travention of the agreement.
2. PROVISIONS FOR DEFINITION OF CENTRAL ISSUES
The agreement should define a procedure by which each party would in
effect be required to state its best case. Where the agreement on alternative
procedures is drafted after the dispute has arisen, the issues to be addressed
can be defined with some specificity. While it will normally be difficult for
each party to make the elections implicit in such a definition, particularly in
a case in which the facts are unclear or complex, the process of sorting out
the issues will in itself force the parties and their counsel to make very care-
ful evaluations of their respective positions at the outset rather than permit-
ting deferral of this analysis until a later stage in the proceedings, as too
frequently occurs in American litigation.
ance with the law of the Contracting State. Article V(2) does, however, permit such a refusal
where the award is contrary to the public policy of the Contracting State in which enforcement
is sought, leaving open the question whether and to what extent a failure of an award to
comply with regulatory laws of that Contracting State would afford a legal excuse for refusal
of its courts to enforce that award.
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If the provisions for alternative dispute resolution procedures are to be
included in the underlying commercial agreement, it will of course be
impossible in most cases to anticipate with any confidence the specific issues
which will be central to any eventual dispute. The only workable approach
to a narrowing of the issues will probably be to limit the time or space
available for preparation and presentation of each party's case, effectively
limiting each party to its best theories and restricting the resort to alterna-
tive pleading and the raising of subsidiary issues. The parties will undoubt-
edly experience some hesitation in accepting such restrictions in relation to
future disputes of unknown size and complexity. However, the most seri-
ous potential for prejudice will obviously be present where the alternative
procedures specified are of the binding variety, whereas the risks would
appear to be minimal where the procedure is non-binding and thus in no
way affects the ability of either party to defend its interests in any ultimate
formal proceedings.
3. DISCOVERY
The discovery provisions of an agreement on alternative procedures
would cover at least two points. First, they would clearly establish the
rights of the parties to request the production by the other party of evi-
dence. In this respect, as noted above, the provisions should be specific as
to the types of evidence required to be produced. Given the relatively
restricted discovery to which foreign lawyers are accustomed, most such
agreements would probably limit discovery to documents directly relevant
to the points at issue and intended to be introduced as evidence.
Second, the provisions would set a definite time limit for discovery and
might also provide sanctions for any failure of a party to produce evidence
within its possession. In light of the difficulty and delay involved in seeking
judicial enforcement of discovery orders issued by an arbitrator, assuming
such enforcement is available at all, the parties may want to consider spe-
cific provisions under which the arbitrator or neutral advisor would be per-
mitted to draw inferences from the failure of a party to produce evidence
within its possession.
4. MANAGEMENT PARTICIPATION
The provisions concerning management participation should clearly
specify the level of management from which the participants are to be cho-
sen and should require their continuous presence and involvement in the
proceedings. The exact form which such participation can most usefully
take will probably be determined only after extensive experimentation by
many companies over a period of years and can be expected to vary
depending on the nature of the disputes and the character of the alternative
procedures. In some cases it may be that management participants will be
best cast in the role of advocates of their respective companies' positions; in
others they may function best as interested observers; and in still others it
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may be appropriate for them to participate as triers of fact. The most
important requirement is that their participation be continuous and integral
to the process.
5. PROVISIONs RELATING TO INTERIM RELIEF
The availability of interim relief may be of critical importance to the
workability of alternative procedures. For example, where the alternative
procedures are employed in the resolution of disputes arising under a long-
term agreement such as a joint venture agreement, their effectiveness
depends on the desire of both parties to settle the issue in a manner which
enables the commercial relationship to continue. To the extent that interim
remedies, such as injunctive relief, may be necessary to preserve the status
quo which is the basis for that relationship, the parties should ensure that
those remedies remain available. At the same time, interim remedies may
be destructive of the commercial relationship particularly where, as in the
case of attachments, they tend to interrupt the normal course of business
and to produce consequences which cannot readily be reversed. In sum,
provisions for interim remedies should be drawn with careful thought to the
dynamics of a potential dispute and with a view to the preservation rather
than destruction of the underlying commercial relationship.
In addressing the subject of interim remedies, it should also be borne in
mind that such remedies may be either judicial or arbitral in nature,
notwithstanding the decision of the parties to employ arbitration for final
resolution of the dispute. As noted above, whether interim judicial reme-
dies will be available may depend on the intent of the parties as expressed
in the arbitration agreement. On the other hand, where it is intended that
any interim relief be granted by the arbitrators, express provision should be
made to that effect as well; such provisions should also permit entry of judg-
ment on any award of the arbitrators granting interim relief. Finally, it
may make sense to include provisions permitting resort to the courts for
certain types of interim relief which would tend to preserve the commercial
relationship, particularly where the immediate availability of judicial reme-
dies at the commencement of the dispute may be important, but to leave to
the arbitrators those types of interim relief which may be needed to protect
either party but which would tend to be more disruptive of the ongoing
commercial relationship. It is appropriate here again to emphasize the
flexibility of commercial arbitration as a framework within which the par-
ties can design their own procedures.
B. Provisions Relating to Non-Binding Procedures
Agreements for the use of non-binding procedures are, by definition, not
arbitration agreements. At the same time, they possess some of the charac-
teristics of arbitration agreements and thus might conceivably be treated as
such for certain purposes by some courts. Counsel should carefully con-
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sider this possibility and its implications, in particular as they relate to such
matters as interim relief and the preservation of judicial remedies.
1. INTERIM RELIEF
The general question of interim relief has been discussed above. How-
ever, special problems may be encountered where the parties provide for
the use of non-binding procedures prior to a resort to final arbitration.
These problems result from the probability that the courts would regard the
entire two-stage process as a single arbitration and thus would in most cases
refuse to intervene to grant interim relief even during the first, non-binding
stage of the procedure. The arbitrators, on the other hand, might not yet
have been appointed, since the parties would presumably want to attempt
to resolve the dispute through the non-binding procedure before incurring
the cost of commencing the more formal arbitral proceeding. Since the
neutral advisor in a non-binding proceeding by definition has no power to
render compulsory decisions even on interim matters, there may be no one
to whom either party could apply for interim relief absent specific provi-
sions permitting such relief.90
2. PRESERVATION OF ULTIMATE REMEDIES
If the parties do not intend the alternative procedures to be binding, they
must preserve their ultimate remedies against the possibility that the alter-
native procedures may fail to produce a settlement.
Where the alternative procedures are cast in the context of an agreement
to arbitrate if the dispute is not otherwise resolved, extreme care must be
taken to ensure that the provision for alternative remedies does not create
loopholes in the arbitral procedures which would enable either party to pre-
vent the commencement of the arbitral proceedings. This will require the
establishment of fixed time deadlines after which arbitration will automati-
cally commence whether or not the informal proceedings have been com-
pleted, and regardless of any fault of either party in failing to complete
those procedures.
Where the alternative procedures are employed outside the context of an
arbitration agreement, counsel must of course be satisfied that agreements
to limit discovery, the scope of the issues involved and any remedies sought
in the alternative procedures will not be treated as a waiver of any proce-
dural or substantive rights in the event the dispute goes to trial. In an inter-
national dispute, it is important to bear in mind that these issues may be
addressed by a foreign court which, in light of its different procedures and
'"In addressing this issue, counsel may find useful as a possible model the provisions of
article 16 of the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, infra n.92, which reads as follows:
The parties undertake not to initiate, during the conciliation proceedings, any arbitral or
judicial proceedings, except that a party may initiate arbitral or judicial proceedings where,
in his opinion, such proceedings are necessary for preserving his rights.
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traditions, may construe any ambiguities differently than would an Ameri-
can court under the same circumstances.
3. USE OF EXISTING MECHANISMS
In drafting agreements for the use of non-binding procedures in interna-
tional disputes, counsel should consider as a starting point the use of
existing conciliation procedures such as those provided for in the Rules of
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce9'
and the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules. 92 While those provisions are not
particularly detailed, they do provide a framework for the establishment of
non-binding procedures which might incorporate any of the features
described above. The UNCITRAL Rules in particular contain some useful
provisions on such matters as confidentiality and admissibility into evi-
dence in subsequent proceedings, and the parties are free to exclude or vary
any of the rules as they wish. The primary advantage of using the ICC or
UNCITRAL rules as a framework would be that, given the widespread
international acceptance of both sets of rules, it may be easier to persuade a
foreign party to accept those rules as a basis for non-binding alternative
procedures rather than attempting to design a complete set of procedures
from the ground up.
Another facility which might be of some value in the structuring of alter-
native procedures is the ICC's International Center for Technical Expertise.
The Chamber's "Rules for Technical Expertise" 93 contain procedures for
the appointment of experts and the definition of the scope of their task.
Again, these rules can be supplemented by such other provisions as the par-
ties consider necessary. As in the case of the conciliation rules, the primary
advantage of the use of the Rules of Expertise may be the general accepta-
bility of ICC procedures to foreign parties.
C. Provisions Relating to Semi-Binding Procedures
The considerations set forth above with respect to non-binding proce-
dures would also apply to the use of semi-binding procedures. In addition,
certain other provisions may be required.
1. ADMISSIBILITY AND WEIGHT OF OPINION
If it is intended that the opinion of the neutral advisor be treated as non-
binding but admissible in evidence in subsequent formal proceedings, the
parties should spell out that intention. In addition, counsel should consider
the possibility that the weight to be accorded that opinion by the courts may
'International Chamber of Commerce, Rules for the ICC Court of Arbitration, supra n.42
at 7-9.
"
2Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, 35 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. No. 17, Doc. A/35/17 (1981), reprinted at 20 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 300 (1981).
"
3International Chamber of Commerce, Rules and Model Provision for Technical Expertise,
Publ. No. 307 (1977).
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differ from one country to another and should, to the extent possible,
include provisions specifically setting forth the intent of the parties in that
regard. To the extent that the dispute is ultimately referred to arbitration,
the arbitrators would presumably feel constrained to accord the advisor's
opinion such weight as the parties had intended, and again this intent
should be incorporated in the agreement.
Another point which should be dealt with in any agreement permitting
the introduction of the advisor's opinion would be a stipulation as to the
advisor's status as an expert as to all matters to be covered by his opinion.
A related issue which should also be addressed is the extent to which the
parties would be free to seek to rebut the advisor's opinion with an opinion
of another expert since, as has been noted above, the procedures and pre-
sumptions of national courts may vary substantially in this respect.
2. PENALTIES
Where the parties desire to put teeth in the alternative procedures by
establishing a penalty for disregard of the advisor's opinion, it will be
important to ensure that the penalty provision is enforceable. In common
law jurisdictions, of course, a penalty clause is normally enforceable only as
a liquidated damages clause, and the amount established will therefore pre-
sumably have to be reasonably related to the legal fees and other costs
likely to be incurred by the prevailing party as a result of the losing party's
failure to abide by the decision of the advisor.
In civil law jurisdictions, penalty clauses are normally enforceable. How-
ever, in agreeing to this kind of a penalty arrangement, counsel should bear
in mind that the losing party in litigation is in many countries liable for the
attorney's fees of the prevailing party. This may mean that the losing party
will be penalized twice, which may give the arrangement more teeth than
was originally contemplated.
3. APPROVAL OF COURT OR ARBITRATOR
Because of the uncertainty as to the effect to be given both to agreements
relating to the admissibility of the adviser's opinion and to penalties for
proceeding without regard to that opinion, it may in some cases be prudent
for counsel to suggest or even insist that any agreement on these subjects be
submitted for the approval of a cognizant court or arbitrator before the
procedure is initiated. While this may involve some delay, this possibility
may be outweighed by the increased confidence of both parties that the use
of the alternative procedures will have the intended consequences and no
others.
D. Provisions Relating to Binding Procedures
In agreeing to binding procedures, it will be important to ensure that the
procedure is final and that the result will not be subject to subsequent attack
which would require relitigation of the entire dispute. The treatment of this
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issue will depend on whether or not the procedures are cast in the form of
an arbitration agreement.
1. OUTSIDE THE ARBITRAL FRAMEWORK
Assuming that the agreement on binding procedures is not cast in the
form of an arbitration agreement, the only really safe means of ensuring
that the result will be accorded conclusive effect is to obtain advance court
approval of the court for the designation of the advisor as a "special
master" or in the civil law systems, as an "expert." In addition, the court
should approve the procedures under which the advisor will operate,
including in particular any agreements relating to limitation of discovery,
narrowing of issues and exclusion of evidence.
In using this approach, two things must be borne in mind. First, even
where such an arrangement is approved by the courts of one country, the
resulting judgment may not be enforceable in the courts of another relevant
country because of the irregularity of the procedures. 94 Even though the
parties will have consented to the departures from the normal approaches,
it is entirely possible that the courts would refuse to recognize a foreign
judgment resulting from such procedures on grounds of public policy.
The second point is that, while the rulings or decisions of a "special
master" or of an "expert" in the civil law sense are conclusive, if at all, only
as to findings of fact, the outcome is subject to attack on grounds that the
advisor improperly construed or applied the relevant law. To the extent
that the parties desired to eliminate this possibility, the procedure should be




"In most of the major legal systems, enforcement of an arbitral award may not be refused
solely on grounds that it is contrary to law, at least unless the parties have expressly agreed that
the arbitrators must decide in accordance with law, but enforcement may be refused if an
award is contrary to the public policy of the state in which enforcement is sought. See, e.g., as
to French law, P. SANDERS, I INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 261 (1956); as to
German law, id. at 55; and as to Japanese law, P. SANDERS, 3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION 95 (1965). See also C. Evans and R. Ellis, International CommercialArbitration:
4 Comparison of Legal Regimes, TEXAS INT'L L.J. 17 (1973). Refusal of enforcement on pub-
lic policy grounds is specifically permitted under article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.
U.S. courts have interpreted this public policy defense narrowly to mean the "most basic
notions of morality and justice" applied by the forum. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v.
Societe Generale de rl'ndustrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). In
Wilko v. Swan, supra n.53, the United States Supreme Court suggested that "manifest disre-
gard" of the law might constitute a defense to enforcement of an arbitral award under Ameri-
can law; however, such a defense is not specifically recognized under the New York
Convention and it seems doubtful that even "manifest disregard" of the law would render an
award contrary to "public policy" within the meaning of the Convention. See Note, The Pub-
lic Policy Defense to Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral A wards, 7 CALIF. W. IN"" J.
228, 235-237 (1977).
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2. WITHIN THE ARBITRAL FRAMEWORK
Because of the flexibility of arbitration, it would not appear difficult to
structure an arbitration agreement in such a manner as to achieve most of
the objectives of the alternative procedures. The principal problems which
will arise in this connection will relate to provisions intended to limit the
scope of inquiry to the issues central to the dispute and to permit senior
managers to participate in the decision-making process. Particularly where
the arbitration agreement is included in the original commercial agreement,
and therefore before the nature of any eventual dispute is known, it may be
very difficult and time-consuming to draft and obtain agreement on provi-
sions which will be tight enough to achieve the desired results and yet suf-
ficiently flexible to accommodate various types of dispute.
a. Limitation of Issues
Limiting the scope of the issues which an arbitrator may address leaves
open the possibility of circumvention of the arbitration agreement. An
arbitration agreement precludes resort to judicial procedures only as to
those issues covered by the arbitration agreement; consequently, limitation
of the scope of the arbitration agreement might invite simultaneous litiga-
tion of other issues arising out of the same dispute.96 The only apparent
means of dealing with this potential problem would be for the parties to
define carefully the scope of the issues being submitted to the arbitrators
and then to either waive any claims outside that scope or agree to defer any
litigation in respect of such claims until after the completion of the arbitral
proceedings.
b. Corporate Managers as Arbitrators
The potential difficulty of obtaining enforcement of any award resulting
from an arbitration in which employees of the parties participate as party-
appointed arbitrators has been noted above. Nonetheless, it would seem
that the use of senior corporate managers in this capacity would have sev-
eral material advantages.
First, the use of one rather than three outside arbitrators would substan-
tially lessen the cost of arbitration, since the fees of two arbitrators would
be saved. Second, and more importantly, the managers would be exposed
to the process of deliberation among the arbitrators, thus giving the man-
ager for each party a much clearer perception of the relative strengths and
weaknesses of his company's position as the arbitration proceeded. This
would merely formalize the basic concept of participation by senior manag-
ers. The only real risk is that it might increase the probability that the arbi-
trators would be unable to arrive at a majority position in favor of any
award.
See M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 12.01 (1968).
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Assuming that the parties desired to use their own managers as party
appointed arbitrators, it would probably be desirable to incorporate in the
arbitration agreement itself a provision permitting such appointment and
waiving any potential challenge to the arbitral award based on lack of
impartiality of either of the party-appointed arbitrators. Consideration
should also be given to provisions governing the rendering of an award in
the absence of agreement between any two of the arbitrators.
V. Some Policy Recommendations
While we have outlined above a number of specific considerations and
possibilities which should be borne in mind by counsel for companies
involved or likely to be involved in transnational disputes, it is perhaps
appropriate to identify some institutional improvements which may be wor-
thy of attention. A useful starting point is to be found in the recommenda-
tions emanating from the Pound Conference, convened in St. Paul in 1976
at the suggestion of Chief Justice Burger to consider ways of improving the
judicial process in this country.97
One of the principal recommendations of the Conference related to the
development of new alternative forums and the expansion of the use of
other alternatives already available. 98 Among the latter was arbitration,
which was felt to afford "significant advantages in terms of expediency,
informality, and the provision of experts in particular fields as
adjudicators." 99
As has been noted above, the framework for international commercial
arbitration has been significantly strengthened over the past few years. At
the same time, a number of problems remain, notably in the areas of
expense and procedural uncertainty. Moreover, possibly because commer-
cial arbitration rules and agreements are generally drafted with a view to
the maximum possible protection of procedural rights, the full potential of
arbitration as an informal, conciliatory form of dispute resolution has not
been achieved. The exploration of some alternative models would seem to
be a project of great utility toward this end.
With respect to the use of judicial procedures to resolve transnational
commercial disputes, there is a clear need for a more highly developed set
of internationally-accepted principles governing the selection of the most
appropriate forum for litigation of a multijurisdictional dispute, the scope
of assistance to be provided by the courts of other countries in resolving
that dispute and the recognition to be accorded by those courts to the even-
tual judgment entered by the court properly seized of the matter. While
adherence to international agreements on these subjects would undoubtedly
"'For a summary of the recommendations, see W. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recom-





raise constitutional questions in many countries, not least the United States,
it is entirely possible that such concerns have in the past been overstated
and that we have been unduly timid in confronting these issues directly.
Even on a unilateral basis, American courts would appear to be in an
excellent position to bring about a substantial improvement in the interna-
tional judicial process. As has been noted above, the extraordinary scope of
American discovery procedures has proved both an irritant and an obstacle
to efforts to obtain the assistance of foreign courts in resolving disputes liti-
gated in the United States. This corresponds with one of the major con-
cerns expressed at the Pound Conference, which recognized the widespread
abuse and overuse of discovery in American litigation. 100 Among the mea-
sures which have been proposed to deal with this problem is a procedural
device referred to as a "discovery conference" which, together with more
tightly drawn standards of relevancy, would enable the courts to control the
scope of discovery where necessary.' 0 ' These and other procedures
designed to focus and expedite the discovery process are likely to be partic-
ularly useful in litigation of international disputes, especially those in which
the process of gathering evidence is complicated by the need for assistance
from foreign courts. Indeed, as the volume of transnational litigation
increases, cases of this type may well provide a laboratory within which
American courts, confronted by the hostility of foreign courts to the typical
American fishing expedition, may have the opportunity to develop tools
and procedures of more general applicability.
Another unilateral step which might contribute substantially to the
improvement of the international judicial process would be the clarification
of American law concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments and the
related issue as to when our courts will stay their own proceedings in defer-
ence to foreign proceedings. Since only a very small percentage of the cases
before our courts present issues having international ramifications, the
American judiciary has tended to treat those situations which do arise as sui
generis, and the issues presented have thus generally been dealt with on the
basis of expediency and without a great deal of thought to the long-term
problems of administering justice at the international level. 10 2 At the same
time, notwithstanding its occasional excesses, American law enjoys consid-
erable international prestige as the most highly developed jurisprudential
system in the world, and our federal system has afforded and will continue
to afford invaluable opportunities for the development of concepts useful in
the administration of justice in a multijurisdictional setting. If American
1001d. at 288-290.
'°'This tendency toward a fragmented approach has resulted at least in pan from the fact
that recognition of foreign judgments has thus far been treated as a matter of state rather than
federal law. See R. von Mehren, supra n.25 at 407. Von Mehren has suggested that the
Supreme Court could go a long way toward the establishment of a coherent body of American
law in this area by holding that recognition of foreign judgments must be governed by a uni-
form federal law. Id. at 414-415.
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courts are willing to exercise leadership in defining improved international
standards relating to the recognition of foreign proceedings, it seems clear
that the example they set will be accorded great weight by the courts of
other countries.

